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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JOHN LEE SALING, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 930730-CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal 
because it is an appeal in a criminal case, not involving a first-
degree or capital felony. Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(f). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Should the lower court have suppressed evidence 
obtained pursuant to a warrantless entry and search of Defendant's 
motel room? Since neither party is disputing the acts by the court 
in determining not to suppress the evidence, this court should 
review the legal conclusions based upon a correction of error 
standard and need accord no deference to the trial court. State 
v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270-71 & n. 11 (Utah 1993); State v. 
Strickley, 844 P.2d at 979, 981 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
TEXT OF AUTHORITIES 
1. 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, in particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U. S. Const. Amend. 4. 
2. 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not abe violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the person or 
thing to be seized. 
Utah Const. Art. I, Section 14. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a criminal action arising from Defendant's 
alleged criminal mischief, theft and possession of burglary tools, 
all misdemeanors. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Subsequent to being charged with the above offenses, 
Defendant made a motion to suppress certain evidence obtained 
through the search of his motel room at the Abby Inn Motel in Cedar 
City, Utah on July 5, 1993. Upon hearing the evidence, the lower 
court denied the motion to suppress. Defendant then made a 
conditional plea of guilty based upon the court's ruling. 
C. Disposition at Trial Court 
Based upon Defendant's conditional plea, the lower 
entered a Judgment, Sentence and Commitment, sentencing Defendant 
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to serve one year in the Iron County Jail, on the criminal mischief 
charge and six months each on the theft and possession of burglary 
tools charges, all to run concurrently, and to pay restitution in 
the total sum of $981.58. 
D. Statement of Facts 
On the late night or early morning of July 4-5, 1993, a 
soda pop vending machine was broken into and money stolen at the 
Abbey Inn Motel in Cedar City, Utah. Defendant and his mother were 
guests of the Abbey Inn on that night and Defendant provided 
information to the police authorities regarding the aforesaid 
incident. (Tr. 34-35). 
Between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m. on the 
morning of July 5, 1993, a Cedar City Police officer knocked on the 
door of Defendant's room, ostensibly to obtain further information 
regarding the incident. Being unable to rouse Defendant or his 
mother, the officer ultimately elicited the aid of the motel 
manager, Mr. Brian Kreitzer, who also attempted to rouse Defendant 
or his mother, both by knocking on the door and by attempting to 
call the room. Although there may be some dispute about whether 
time of entry was before or after the 11:00 a.m. checkout, both the 
officer and Mr. Kreitzer testified that Mr. Kreitzer obtained a 
pass key to bypass the dead bolt security locking system of the 
motel room and to open the door to the room. Mr. Kreitzer 
justified this action on the basis that the check out time was 
11:00 a.m. and he believed that the Defendant and his mother had 
exited the room by other means. Defendant's mother was an invalid 
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and required the use of a wheel chair. (Tr. 34, 36, 48-49). 
Mr. Kreitzer further testified that a locked deadbolt, 
as was the case here, normally indicated that a customer was still 
in the room. He further indicated that he was suspicious about 
Defendant when he obtained the pass key to bypass the deadbolt. 
Finally, Mr. Kreitzer testified that although it was past the 11:00 
a.m. regular checkout time it was still the Motel's policy to 
maintain privacy and security for its customers. (Tr. 68-71). 
Upon gaining access to the room, Defendant ultimately 
came to the door. While standing near the door talking to 
Defendant, the officer and/or Mr. Kreitzer observed a tire iron 
near Defendant's bed and a duffel bag, which was partially opened. 
The officer asked Defendant for permission to search the duffel 
bag, which was given. While observing the contents of the duffel 
bag, the officer and Mr. Kreitzer observed parts believed to be 
from the vending machine, which were seized. (Tr. 38-42, 51-53). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There were no exigent circumstances to justify the 
warrantless entry of the Defendant's motel room. Consequently all 
the evidence obtained as consequence of the unlawful entry should 
have been suppressed by the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE WARRANTLESS ENTRY AND SEARCH OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTEL ROOM WAS UNJUSTIFIED 
Although there is some dispute as to when the officer and 
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manager entered Defendant's motel room, the trial court found that 
the search occurred at or shortly after 11:00 a.m., which was the 
motel's regular checkout time. The first issue, then, is whether 
there was actually a "search" of the room. In Boyd v. United 
States, the United States Supreme Court defined a "search" as 
contemplated under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution as "the 
invasion of [the] indefeasible right of personal security, personal 
liberty and private property." Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 
616, 630 (1883). The Court has also held that a person has a 
reasonable privacy expectation in a hotel room, and, therefore, an 
entry into the same, without a warrant, constitutes a search. 
Hoffa v. United States 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966). See also, United 
States v. Windsor, 846 F.2d 1569 (9th Cir. 1988). 
In the instant case, although the checkout time may have 
passed, Defendant still maintained an expectation of privacy and 
security. Indeed, the motel manager stated that as a policy the 
motel seeks to maintain the privacy of its guests even after 
checkout time. Defendant demonstrated this desire for privacy by 
securing the dead bolt in the room. The motel manager stated that 
when the deadbolt was secured it was his usual expectation that 
someone would be in the room. He claims he deviated from this 
expectation in this case, believing that Defendant may have left 
the room through a window, because he was "suspicious" of the 
Defendant. Of course, such suspicions, if true, were unreasonable, 
since Defendant's mother, who was also in the room, was an invalid, 
confined to a wheelchair. 
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The fact that Defendant failed to answer the telephone, 
likewise is not evidence of his lack of expectation of privacy. 
On the contrary, it demonstrates the opposite: that he did not wish 
to be contacted or to communicate with anyone and wanted to 
maintain his "privacy". 
A second issue is whether the entry into the motel room 
was a private act by the motel manager. Of course, it is only 
governmental acts that subject evidence to exclusion under the 
Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment "is wholly inapplicable fto 
search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private 
individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the 
participation and knowledge of any governmental official!". United 
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U. S. 109, 115 (1984) (quoting with approval 
Walter v. United States, 447 U. S. 649, 662 (1980)(Blackmun, J., 
dissenting)). 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that "[w]hen 
a governmental official affirmatively facilitates or encourages an 
unreasonable search performed by a private person, a constitutional 
violation occurs". Specht v. Jenson, 832 F.2d 515-16, 523 (10th 
Cir.),rehfg granted in part en banc, 837 F.2d 940 and remanded on 
rehfg en banc, 853 F.2d 805 (1987). 
In this case, it appears that the police officer 
initially attempted to contact Defendant by knocking on the door 
of Defendant's motel room. After being unsuccessful, rather than 
seeking to obtain a warrant, the officer simply contacted the 
manager and elicited his aid in gaining entry into the motel room. 
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When the entry was accomplished, both the officer and the motel 
manager were present. Accordingly, since the officer not only 
encouraged the unlawful entry by the motel manager, but 
specifically requested it, the entry into the Defendant's motel 
room was governmental. 
Having established that the entry into Defendant's motel 
room was a "governmental search" within the contemplation of the 
Fourth Amendment, the next question is whether there were 
circumstances justifying the entry without a warrant. A 
warrantless search is per se unreasonable absent an appropriate 
exception. The only possible exception applicable here is what 
is known as exigent circumstances. The burden is upon the State 
to demonstrate those exigent circumstances. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 
466 U. S. 740, 748-50 (1984); Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 
585-90 (1980); Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967). 
In State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1245 (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court has adopted the above-stated general rule and has 
stated the following with regard to exigent circumstances: 
Generally, exigency does not evolve from one 
individual fact. Instead, there is often a 
mosaic of evidence, no single part of which is 
itself sufficient. Our task is to review the 
totality of the facts and circumstances of the 
particular case to determine if the finding of 
exigency is proper. 
Id. at 1258. 
In the instant case, the State has failed to produce any 
single facts, let alone a "mosaic" of facts that would support 
exigent circumstances. The case at bar is more similar to the case 
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of State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
In Beavers, Defendant allegedly committed a burglary and 
theft of clothing from two retail stores. The clothing was 
allegedly stored at the apartment of one Nichols. The following 
day, the manager of Nichols1 apartment complex telephoned police 
officers stating that he had overheard a loud argument coming from 
Nichols1 apartment. Officers responded to the scene and found the 
latching mechanism on the door to be broken and that the door was 
open a few inches. Apparently Nichols was not home, but the police 
overheard a conversation near the slightly open door between two 
occupants of the apartment about the value of coats. There was no 
evidence that the occupants were not present as guests of the 
tenant. One of the occupants, Davis, then began to leave the 
apartment and stepped through the door carrying a coat. When he 
saw the officers, he uttered an expletive and immediately stepped 
back across the threshold into the apartment. One of the officers 
reached across the threshold, grabbed Davis, flipped his legs out 
from under him and forced him into a prone position on the floor. 
Then the same officer observed another occupant "fumbling with a 
pile of clothes on the floor while the other two persons fled from 
sight." Fearing for the safety of himself and the other officers, 
the first officer called to the other officers present, who entered 
the apartment with their guns drawn. Subsequent to the entry by 
the officers, and while checking the apartment for other 
individuals, they observed new coats hanging in closets, which were 
ultimately seized as evidence. Jj3. at 10-11. 
8 
The lower court denied a Motion to Suppress the evidence 
obtained in the apartment, but this court reversed, holding that 
the entry into the apartment was unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 
14 of the Utah Constitution. With regard to whether the entry was 
reasonable because of exigent circumstances, this court found that 
there were no justifiable exigent circumstances. Specifically, the 
court found that there was no reasonable risk that the evidence 
(the numerous coats) could be destroyed. Similarly, there was no 
risk of the suspects escaping when the apartment was on a second 
floor. Finally, there was not evidence of a substantial risk of 
harm to the officers, because there was no reasonable belief that 
any of the occupants had any weapons. Id. at 18-19. 
In the instant case, there was likewise no evidence that 
the evidence, if any, would be destroyed, especially in light of 
the items that were found. Defendant simply had no means to 
destroy the evidence in the motel room. Similarly, there was no 
evidence that Defendant was armed or otherwise dangerous and the 
officer and manager certainly did not indicate such. It is highly 
unlikely that the officer would have allowed the manager to enter 
the room with him, if he thought there was a danger to himself or 
others. There is, some evidence presented by the State that there 
was concern that Defendant might flee. But, again, that is 
inconsistent with the fact that Defendant had an invalid mother who 
was confined to a wheelchair. 
In Beavers the State also claimed that the search was 
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reasonable because of the suspicion roused in the officers as they 
listened to the conversation in the apartment. This exception is 
based upon the case of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20-23 (1968). 
This court specifically held that Terry, which involved a stop of 
an automobile, does not apply to warrantless entry of a home and 
stated that "police canfnot] enter a dwelling without a warrant on 
the basis of reasonable suspicion. An extension of the Terry 
doctrine to warrantless entries of private premises is contrary to 
Fourth Amendment principles." Beavers, 859 P.2d at 17. 
In the instant case, the manager and the police officer 
both testified that they were suspicious about Defendant and his 
possible involvement in the alleged crime. Such suspicion is 
unreasonable. Defendant was no different than any other motel 
patron who wished to secure his room against entry by a maid, other 
motel personnel or another person. Moreover every person has the 
fundamental right not to answer knocks at his door or the ring of 
his telephone. It assumes too much to claim that simply failing 
to answer the door or telephone means that a person has probably 
been involved in criminal activity. Nevertheless, under Beavers, 
even if such suspicions were reasonable, it did not justify the 
entry into Defendant's motel room without a warrant. 
Finally, because the mere entry into the motel room was 
constitutionally improper, as in Beavers, any evidence obtained 
after the entry, should have been excluded, including the evidence 
obtained from Defendant's duffel bag, despite his consent for the 
officer to search it. All such evidence constitutes the "fruit of 
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a poisonous tree". Beavers, 859 P.2d at 19. 
CONCLUSION 
Because there were not exigent circumstances justifying 
the warrantless entry of Defendant's motel room, the evidence 
obtained through such "search" should have been suppressed by the 
lower court. Therefore, this court should reverse the judgment of 
the lower court and remand the same to the trial court for the 
entry of a dismissal of all charges against Defendant. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of May, 1994. 
F L O W W H O L M 
Attorney for Defendant /Appel lant 
& = * 
i i 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to Ms, Jan Graham, 
Utah Attorney General, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84114, this 16th day of May, 1994, first class postage fully 
prepaid. 
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ADDENDUM TO JOHN SALING BRIEF 
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SCOTT M. BURNS - USB #4283 
Iron County Attorney 
97 North Main, Suite #1 
P.O. Box 428 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-6694 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN LEE SALING, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, AND 
COMMITMENT 
Criminal No. 931500422 
Judge Robert T. Braithwaite 
The Defendant, JOHN LEE SALING, having entered pleas of guilty to the offenses of 
CRIMINAL MISCHIEF, a Class A Misdemeanor; THEFT, a Class B Misdemeanor; and 
POSSESSION OF BURGLARY TOOLS, a Class B Misdemearfbr; on October 5, 1993, and the 
Court having accepted said pleas and thereafter having ordered the preparation of a Presentence 
Investigation Report, and after said report was prepared and presented to the1 Court, the Court 
having called the matter on for sentencing on November 15, 1993, in Cedar City, Utah, and the 
Defendant having appeared before the Court in person together with his attorney of record, Floyd 
W Holm, and the State of Utah having appeared by and through Iron County Attorney Scott M. 
Burns, and the Court having reviewed the Presentence Investigation Report and thereafter having 
heard statements from the Defendant, his attorney, and the Iron County Attorney, and the Court 
being fully advised in the premises, now makes and enters the following Judgment, Sentence, and 
Commitment, to wit: 
JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, JOHN 
LEE SALING, has been convicted of the offenses of CRIMINAL MISCHIEF, a Class A 
Misdemeanor; THEFT, a Class B Misdemeanor; and POSSESSION OF BURGLARY TOOLS, 
a Class B Misdemeanor; and the Court having asked whether the Defendant had anything to say 
in regard to why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary 
being shown or appearing to the Court, it is adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as charged and 
convicted. 
SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, JOHN LEE SALING, and pursuant to his 
conviction of CRIMINAL MISCHIEF, a Class A Misdemeanor, is hereby sentenced to a term 
of incarceration in the Iron County Jail for a period of one (1) year, and the Defendant is hereby 
placed in the custody of the Iron County Sheriff. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, JOHN LEE SALING, and pursuant to 
his conviction of THEFT, a Class B Misdemeanor, is hereby sentenced to a term of incarceration 
in the Iron County Jail for a period of six (6) months. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, JOHN LEE SALING, and pursuant to 
his conviction of POSSESSION OF BURGLARY TOOLS, a Class B Misdemeanor, is hereby 
sentenced to a term of incarceration in the Iron County Jail for a period of six (6) months. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the one-year term of incarceration and the two (2) 6-
month terms of incarceration shall be served concurrently. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant pay restitution to Coca-Cola Bottling 
Company in the amount of seven hundred twenty-two dollars ($722.00) and to the Abbey Inn of 
Cedar City, Utah, in the amount of two hundred fifty-nine dollars and fifty-eight cents ($259.58), 
for a total restitution amount of nine hundred eighty-one dollars and fifty-eight cents ($981.58). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant be evaluated for an appropriate substance 
abuse program. In the event he is diagnosed as having a substance abuse problem and an 
appropriate program is located, the matter shall be brought back before the Court for review and 
for entry of further orders by the Court. 
COMMITMENT 
TO THE SHERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH: 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, JOHN LEE SALING, and 
deliver him to the Iron County AJtah State Correctional Facility, there to be kept and confined in 
accordance with the above and foregoing Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment. 
DATED this 11 day of November, 1993. 
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CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF IRON ) 
I, LINDA WILLIAMSON, Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron 
County, State of Utah, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true, and exact copy of the 
original Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment in the case entitled State of Utah vs John Lee 
Saline, Criminal No. 931500422, now on file and of record in my office. 
WITNESS my hand and the seal of said office in Cedar City, County of Iron, State of 
Utah, this _ _ _ 2 u £ _ a a y of November, 1993. 
UNPA W1U-IAM8QN 
LINDA WILLIAMSON 
District Court Clerk 
By: 7-/I4-/1 
Deputy District Court Clerk 
r * 
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — 
Issuance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
war ran t shall issue but upon probable cause sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 189€ 
78-2a-3. Cour t of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue 
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and pro-
cess necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, 
and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies 
or appeals from the district court review of infor-
mal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, ex-
cept the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, Board of State Lands. Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of 
political subdivisions of the stale or other lo-
cal agencies; and 
(h) a challenge to agency action under 
Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except 
those from the small claims department of a cir-
cuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
charge of a first degTee or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal 
cases, except those involving a conviction of a 
first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for ex-
traordinary writs sought by persons who are in-
carcerated or serving any other criminal sen-
tence, except petitions constituting a challenge to 
a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree 
or capital felony; 
